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The role that the board can have in influencing the adoption of non-financial reporting (NFR) by companies is a topic that has raised interest in the recent literature. However, very few have so far been said on the logic that underpins the selection by corporate boards of a particular model (sustainability and/or integrated). This study aims to examine if and to what extent board characteristics may influence the choice of companies to voluntarily publish a sustainability report, an integrated report or both of them, and if moderating variables, relating to incentives towards corporate transparency, may have an influence. Both of these types of reporting tools are in fact aimed at improving company disclosure towards sustainable development.

Through a multi-nomial regression analysis, this study tests the assumptions in a sample of companies listed on the Eurostoxx600 that adopt integrated or sustainability reporting or both of them for the period 2015–2018 for a total of 2,103 firm-years observations.

The results reveal that sustainability reporting is associated with board independence only, whilst the adoption of integrated reporting is influenced by board size and board independence. The same two variables influence also those companies that jointly adopt both sustainability and an integrated report. This confirms that integrated reporting requires more competencies and monitoring to be adopted. Furthermore, the results provide evidence that information asymmetry and financial constraints influence the decision of companies to publish the integrated report, sustainability report or both, whilst growth opportunities do not. Hence, moderating variables can have a role in explaining this association, and especially those that are related to the firm’s incentives related to the provision of financial capital by investors.

This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it proposes an incremental analysis of the relationship between board characteristics and voluntary disclosure of integrated reporting, considering the effects of moderating variables on this association. Second, the above relationship is examined in a comparative way vis-à-vis the adoption of sustainability reporting. Third, it demonstrates that the analysis of these reporting tools can benefit from an understanding that relies on both agency and stakeholder theories, that have to be conceived somehow complementary. In terms of limitations, this study is exclusively focussed on larger European listed firms, and therefore, the findings may not be valid for small and medium firms and for companies operating outside Europe.

This study provides useful insights for managers and policymakers to better understand which are the characteristics of the board composition that can best encourage a company to pursue a reporting strategy based on sustainable development. This results to be particularly relevant and timely in the European context if the authors take into consideration the developments of the European Parliament and Commission towards the launch of a new legislative proposal on sustainable corporate governance in 2021.

The study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it offers a unique perspective on the direct and indirect effects of board characteristics on the adoption of integrated and/or sustainability reports by examining it in a comparative perspective. Second, it further demonstrates that the analysis of NFR and especially integrated reporting might benefit from the adoption of multiple conceptual lenses, in this case, agency and stakeholder theories.

This study aims to examine whether insider purchases made within 30 days prior to the publication of various kinds of press releases earn higher abnormal returns (AR) than those in the absence of such announcements. It also attempts to identify the factors that explain ARs.

This study considers data for Canadian insider purchases made on the Toronto Stock Exchange 60 Index. An event study methodology is used to calculate AR, and a mixed regression model is used to evaluate the effect of corporate news on AR.

The empirical results indicate that insiders achieve greater ARs when they purchase stock prior to press releases; findings also show that these returns are specifically related to purchases made before the announcements of mergers and acquisitions, ongoing projects, financial structure, financial results and asset disposals. This is because of the firm effect.

These findings have important implications for Canadian market regulatory authorities, especially the Ontario Securities Commission and other market participants who are interested in corporate governance, such as boards of directors and shareholders.

The present findings show that regulatory bodies must work with companies to raise awareness of improper insider trading.

Most setup management techniques associated with electronic assembly operations focus on component similarity in grouping boards for batch processing. These process planning techniques often minimize setup times. On the contrary, grouping with respect to component geometry and frequency has been proved to further minimize assembly time. Thus, we propose the Placement Location Metric (PLM) algorithm to recognize and measure the similarity between printed circuit board (PCB) patterns. Grouping PCBs based on the geometric and frequency patterns of components in boards will form clusters of locations and, if these clusters are common between boards, similarity among layouts can be recognized. Hence, placement time will decrease if boards are grouped together with respect to the geometric similarity because the machine head will travel less. Given these notions, this study develops a new technique to group PCBs based on the essences of both component commonality and the PLM. The proposed pattern recognition method in conjunction with the Improved Group Setup (IGS) technique can be viewed as an extended enhancement to the existing Group Setup (GS) technique, which groups PCBs solely according to component similarity. Our analysis indicates that the IGS performs relatively well with respect to an array of existing setup management strategies. Experimental results also show that the IGS produces a better makespan than its counterparts over a low range of machine changeover times. These results are especially important to operations that need to manufacture quickly batches of relatively standardized products in moderate to larger volumes or in flexible cell environments. Moreover, the study provides justification to adopt different group management paradigms by electronic suppliers under a variety of processing conditions.

I test empirically the hypothesis that the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the severity of the agency problems and the amount of information needed to monitor. I show that in high growth firms, where the agency conflicts are low and managers are likely to reveal more information to get advice, boards are more independent but less likely to monitor, while in low growth firms, boards are less likely to be independent, but the relationship between firm value and board independence is strong. Overall, boards become more independent but monitor less as firms’ growth opportunities increase, suggesting that managers trade off the amount of information released to the board to get a better advice and to mitigate the monitoring role of the board.

Agency theory starts with the assumption that people act in their own self‐interest, and holds that under normal conditions, the goals, interests, and risks of two actors (principal and agent) are not identical. This means that the agent will not necessarily act according to the interests of the principal. CEO compensation is the type of control mechanism that companies employ to reduce the agency problem. This paper took 201 manufacturing companies in the year 1998 in Taiwan, and used the LISTREL 8 model to analyze the influence of company performance, scale, and board of director control over CEO compensation. The results indicate is that company performance, scale, and control by the board of directors all influence CEO compensation, with company scale the main factor, followed by company performance, and control by the board of directors. I also find that CEO compensation is higher when the board of directors' does not have effective control. Moreover, the board of directors control of a company is diminished when the CTO and chairman of the board are one person, and also when the number of internal directors is great. Conversely, the board of directors' control is increased when their ratio of stock ownership is higher.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of firm-, industry- and country-level determinants on real annual sales growth in the context of a cross-classified multilevel perspective.

The authors studied 11,381 firms from 17 industries in six Latin American countries based on the data collected up to 2015. Since the data are nested in two levels (level 1: firms; level 2: cross-classification of industries and countries), the authors use a cross-classified multilevel model. The significant variability in all levels of analysis confirms the option for the multilevel model.

Differences in industries account for the largest proportion of variance (77.2 percent). This finding indicates that industry-level characteristics should be explored in the sales growth literature (it seems to the authors that they were neglected). This finding also calls attention to the roles of policy-makers in facilitating firm growth. The final model indicates that the considered variables explain approximately 55 percent of the differences in real annual sales growth in the same industry and country after having accounted for the impacts of the differences in firms. After accounting for the impacts of the differences in firms’ and countries’ characteristics, 43 percent of the variation in average real annual sales growth is due to differences in industries. The obtained results indicate that while firms from countries with higher GDP growth and more effective corporate boards present higher real annual sales growth, firms that operate in commodity producer industries have worse performance in this indicator. With respect to firm’s characteristics, larger firms (contradicting Gibrat’s law) and exporters grew less. Some results could be explained by the decrease in commodities’ prices and global purchases between 2012 and 2015.

The paper fills some gaps in the firm growth literature by testing Gibrat’s law in non-developed countries (not yet done, to the best of the authors’ knowledge) and exploring variables other than size in the explanation of firm growth (rarely used, to the best of the authors’ knowledge). Moreover, the adopted model correctly estimated the origin of the variability in firm growth in its natural cross-classified distinct levels.

The empirical relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, the investment opportunity set (IOS) and corporate governance mechanisms is analyzed for a sample of 415 Canadian firms in 1997. Results indicate that firms with high IOS pay higher levels of total compensation to their CEOs. In addition, CEOs of high IOS derive a larger proportion of their compensation from performance‐contingent forms of pay such as bonuses, stock option grants and long‐term incentive plans. However, CEOs with weak boards of directors are compensated more than CEOs with powerful boards. Contrary to our expectation, we find that in high IOS firms with weak boards of directors, CEOs seek to have higher proportions of contingent forms of pay in their compensation. An implication of this result is that contingent compensation practices may be a more value‐enhancing form of remuneration for CEOs.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to examine the hypothesized effects of board characteristics and performance on directors’ compensation in the Spanish corporations, whose corporate governance is a special example of a unitary board system.

Methodology/approach – In order to test the influence of a set of factors on directors’ compensation levels, we have developed several models based on linear panel data regression. The sample included 76 listed companies on the Spanish computerized trading system or Continuous Market for the period 2004–2009.

Findings – The control mechanisms, like board characteristics and performance and their effect on the level of directors’ compensation, depend on the types of director (executive, independent and proprietary).

Research limitations/implications (if applicable) – This study has certain limitations mainly related to problems associated with obtaining information. The methodology should be complemented by other types of analyses, such as the influence of the characteristics of the board on the remuneration structure in a greater level of disaggregation.

Practical implications (if applicable) – The results of this research chapter give reasons to regulators and investors to be aware of the importance of the board's characteristics as corporate control mechanisms over the directors’ remuneration and the necessity of connection between directors’ compensation and the firm's performance.

Originality/value of paper – Firstly, descriptive empirical evidence on the level of directors’ compensation is provided within a unitary board system for different types of directors. Secondly, an ample panel data set enables the examination of a set of determinants using panel data methods which control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Finally, the perspective is extended from executive director compensation to other types of directors, such as proprietary or independent, which are very important features of the Spanish board structure.

This study aims to explore the status and drivers (including free-floated shares, board size, rule duality and board independence) of corporate risk disclosure (CRD) for the conventional listed banks in the Egyptian stock market from 2010 to 2021, which include the country’s major political upheavals and the COVID-19 pandemic.

This study based on a sample of 117 annual reports of sampled banks from 2010 to 2021. RD index of Al-Maghzom (2016) was developed and adopted to quantify CRD using an unweighted scoring system. The multiple linear regression model was used to validate the hypotheses.

The analysis shows that the COVID-19 pandemic increased insignificantly disclosure of all risks except for segment risks. In addition, findings reveal that all sampled banks adhere highly to the requirements of mandatory RD, with a low level of adherence to voluntary RD. Moreover, the analysis concluded that the board size and free-floating shares positively affect the disclosure of financial, operational, general information.

The study’s limitations include the content analysis methodology, reliance on annual reports, emphasis on financial and non-financial risks, focus on listed conventional banks in Egypt.

Current study’s findings are more likely to be useful for many parties. It informs investors about the characteristics of the boards’ directors of Egyptian listed banks that disclosed risk information. Banks should disclose more comprehensive risk information. For academics, the current study’s limitations can be considered in their future research.

This work fills a new research area in which there is relatively little research in emerging financial markets that adds new evidence to the relationship between RD and both free-floating shares and board characteristics, particularly in Egypt.

The study explores extant knowledge on the nature of the relationship between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, particularly board characteristics and audit quality, respectively, while also investigating how the relationship varies across geographies.

The extant knowledge is synthesized using a meta-analysis, which is conducted using a sample of 56 empirical studies from publications of varying grades. The studies span over 25 years (1996–2021) and cover 147 empirical samples (343,787 firm-year observations) across more than 20 countries. The dependent variable is audit fees, and the independent variable captures 12 different measures of board characteristics.

Overall, the results reveal a positive association between board characteristics and audit fees, indicating complementarity between governance mechanisms. Effect size analysis shows board characteristics, like size and independence, are positively associated with audit fees. However, heterogeneity is noted for some characteristics, and further analysis by geography (developed vs emerging countries) explains the heterogeneity.

This study helps multiple stakeholders like firms, shareholders, boards, regulators and policymakers in designing and strengthening governance frameworks.

Both governance and auditing literature benefit from identifying specific board characteristics that drive audit quality consistently across different institutional settings and samples. Heterogeneity analysis helps improve the understanding of contradictions documented in prior literature.

This meta-analysis is the first to explore the interplay between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, with a focus on board characteristics and audit quality. The study provides valuable insights on how different governance mechanisms influence each other while highlighting, for the first time, how the interaction between governance mechanisms varies by a country's level of development.